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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Jacob Taylor Rainier appeals from a jury verdict finding him guilty of
possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance.

Specifically, Rainier

appeals the denial of his pretrial motions to dismiss and suppress.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
The state charged Rainier with possession with the intent to deliver
following a traffic stop of Rainier which led to the seizure of marijuana packaged
for sale. (R., pp.48-49, 181-182; PSI, p.4.)
Rainier filed a motion to dismiss the possession with intent charge,
advancing his belief that marijuana should no longer be characterized as a
schedule I controlled substance under I.C. § 37-2705, and as such he could not
be charged under I.C. § 37-2732(a)(1)(B), a statute making it a crime to possess
marijuana with the intent to deliver based on the schedule I classification of
marijuana. (R., pp.60-66.)

In denying his motion to dismiss, district court found

unpersuasive Rainer's argument that because marijuana is legal in some states,
it is no longer correctly classified as unaccepted for medicinal purposes under
Idaho law and should therefore void the portion of the statute pertinent to
Rainier's charges. (Tr., p.10, L.21 - p.12, L.2; R., pp.91-92.)
Rainier also filed a motion to suppress, asserting the police officer "lacked
reasonable, articulable suspicion to execute a warrantless traffic stop" of
Rainier's vehicle. (R., p.50.) The officer testified at hearing that he pulled over
Rainier's vehicle because he "observed a traffic violation, a left-hand turn that
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was made into the far right-hand lane instead of the one available lane of travel."
(Tr., p.18, Ls.17-20.) The district court denied the motion to suppress, finding the
statute "does say you're supposed to turn into the left-hand lane or the fast lane."
(Tr., p.54, Ls.1-3; R., pp.93-94.)
The matter proceeded to trial where a jury returned a verdict of guilty to
the charge of possession with the intent to deliver a controlled substance. (R.,
pp.226-227.)

The court placed Rainier on a two-year period of supervised

probation with an underlying sentence of two years fixed followed by two years
indeterminate. (R., p.236.) Rainier timely appealed. (R., pp.241-244.)
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ISSUES

Rainier states the issues on appeal as:
I.

Whether marijuana is a Schedule I controlled substance.

II.

Whether the courts can impose punishment on the basis of
arbitrary law.

Ill.

Whether I.C. § 49-644 prohibits turning left into any lane but
the left-most.

(Appellant's brief, p. 5.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.

Has Rainier failed to establish the district court erred in denying his motion
to dismiss where the statute under which he was convicted of possession
with the intent to deliver is clear on its face?

2.

Has Rainier failed to show error in the denial of his motion to suppress?
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ARGUMENT
I.
Rainier Has Failed To Establish The District Court Erred In Denying His Motion
To Dismiss
A.

Introduction
The district court denied Rainier's motion, holding I.C. § 37-2732(a)(1)(B)

is not "void for absurdity." (Tr., p.11, L.25.) In reaching its conclusion, the court
recognized its inability to "ignore the clear written rules of law of the state" in
order to "reclassify marijuana." (Tr., p.11, Ls.20-22.)
Rainier contends that the district court erred because applying I.C. § 372732(a)(1 )(B) as written would lead to an absurd result. (Appellant's brief, pp.612.) Rainier argues, without authority, that because other states have legalized
the use of marijuana, the Idaho statute should no longer classify it as a schedule
I controlled substance. (Appellant's brief, 7-9.) Rainier acknowledges the Court
"cannot itself reschedule cannabis to schedule II," but asserts the statute as
currently written cannot be enforced.

(Appellant's brief, p.11.)

Because the

statute itself is clear and unambiguous, Rainier's argument fails.

His position

would be more properly advanced through his local legislator.

B.

Standard Of Review
The

meaning

and

effect

of

a

statute,

including

the

statute's

constitutionality, is a question of law over which the appellate courts exercise free
review. State v. Hart, 135 Idaho 827, 829, 25 P.3d 850, 852 (2001 ).
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C.

The District Court Correctly Concluded The Statute Rainier Was
Convicted Under Is Clear On Its Face
It is axiomatic and long-established that a statute will be interpreted

according to its plain language and that where the language is plain the court will
not resort to principles of statutory construction. State v. Schwartz, 139 Idaho
360, 362, 79 P.3d 719, 721 (2003); State v. McCoy, 128 Idaho 362, 365, 913 P.2d
578, 581 (1996).

"When a statute is unambiguous, it must be interpreted in

accordance with its language, courts must follow it as enacted, and a reviewing
court may not apply rules of construction." State v. Wiedmeier, 121 Idaho 189,
191, 824 P.2d 120, 122 (1992) (citations omitted).
Idaho Code § 37-2732(a)(1)(8) prohibits the delivery of a schedule I
nonnarcotic drug.

I. C. § 37-2705(d)(30) classifies marijuana as a schedule I

controlled substance.

Under the plain language of these statutes, delivery of

marijuana is criminalized under I.C. § 37-2732(a)(1)(8).
Although

Idaho

Code

§

37-2705(d)(30)

unambiguously

classifies

marijuana as a schedule I controlled substance, Rainier contends that the plain
language does not control because it leads to an absurd result:
Passed long ago in a different time, administered by an agency that
failed to reschedule cannabis as it ceased to meet the requirements
laid out by the legislature, the [Uniform controlled Substances] Act
has become, as it applies to cannabis, absurd.
(Appellant's brief, p.11.) Rainier acknowledges "a court in Idaho cannot itself
reschedule cannabis to schedule II," but argues it "may not enforce a law that
has no sense" and as such, Rainier's "case should have been dismissed."
(Appellant's brief, p.11.)
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While the Idaho Supreme Court has previously "responded to arguments
that the wording of an unambiguous statute would produce an absurd result," the
Court recently recognized that they "have never agreed with such arguments."
Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889, 896, 265
P.3d 502, 509 (2011) (citations omitted). The Court continued:
Thus, we have never revised or voided an unambiguous
statute on the ground that it is patently absurd or would produce
absurd results when construed as we do not have the authority to
do so. The public policy of legislative enactments cannot be
questioned by the courts and avoided simply because the courts
might not agree with the public policy so announced. Indeed, the
contention that we could revise an unambiguous statue because
we believed it was absurd or would produce absurd results is itself
illogical. A statute is ambiguous where the language is capable of
more than one reasonable construction. An unambiguous statute
would have only one reasonable interpretation. An alternative
interpretation that is unreasonable would not make it ambiguous. If
the only reasonable interpretation were determined to have an
absurd result, what other interpretation would be adopted? It would
have to be an unreasonable one.

kl (citations omitted).
Therefore, because I.C. § 37-2732(a)(1)(B) unambiguously applies to the
possession of marijuana with the intent to deliver, neither a district court nor an
appellate court may alter that statute to change the classification of marijuana on
the ground that applying I.C. § 37-2732(a)(1)(B) as written would lead to absurd
results.

Idaho Code § 37-2732(a)(1)(B) unambiguously applies to the

possession of marijuana with the intent to deliver. Reclassification of marijuana
must be addressed through the pharmacy board and/or the legislature and
Rainier has provided no authority otherwise.
correct in denying Rainier's motion to dismiss.
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The district court was therefore

11.
Rainier Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His Motion To Suppress

A

Introduction
Rainier challenges the denial of his motion to suppress, arguing as he did

below that the traffic "stop in this case was made without reasonable and
articulable suspicion of a law violation." (Appellant's brief, p.16.) Specifically, he
contends that although he "had turned left from a lane specifically intended for
such turns into the right-most lane" (Appellant's brief, p.13), this did not violate
I.C. § 49-644 which provides for a left-hand turn being made into the "extreme
left-hand lane" (Appellant's brief, p.13).

Rainier's argument fails.

The district

court correctly interpreted I.C. § 49-644(2) as "say[ing] you're supposed to turn
into the left-hand lane or the fast lane" after making a left turn, instead of
"cross[ing] over and turn[ing] into the right hand lane or the slow lane." (Tr., p.53,
L.6 - 54, L.3.)

Because the officer observed Rainier make a "left turn, but

instead of turning into the closest left land available nearest the center of the
road, turned into the far outside lane nearest the sidewalk," (Tr., p.19, Ls.1-4),
the officer had a reasonable, articulable basis to conduct the traffic stop.
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B.

Standard Of Review
In reviewing a decision on a motion to suppress, the appellate court

accepts the trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial
evidence, but freely reviews the application of constitutional principles to those
facts. State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 302, 160 P.3d 739, 741 (2007).
The interpretation and construction of a statute present questions of law
over which the appellate court exercises free review. State v. Thompson, 140
Idaho 796,798,102 P.3d 1115, 1117 (2004).

C.

The District Court Correctly Applied The Law To The Facts In Concluding
That The Officer Had Reasonable Suspicion To Stop Rainier Because He
Violated The Turning Requirements Of I.C. § 49-644(2)
"A traffic stop by an officer constitutes a seizure of the vehicle's occupants

and implicates the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures." State v. Young, 144 Idaho 646, 648, 167 P.3d 783, 785
(Ct. App. 2006) (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979)).
Ordinarily, a warrantless seizure must be based on probable cause to be
reasonable.

Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 499-500 (1983); State v. Bishop,

146 Idaho 804,811,203 P.3d 1203, 1210 (2009). However, limited investigatory
detentions, based on less than probable cause, are permissible when justified by
an officer's reasonable, articulable suspicion that a person has committed, or is
about to commit, a crime. Royer, 460 U.S.at 498; Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811,203
P.3d at 1210. "An officer may also stop a vehicle to investigate possible criminal
behavior if there is reasonable articulable suspicion that the vehicle is being
driven contrary to traffic laws." Young, 144 Idaho at 648, 167 P.3d at 785 (citing
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United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981)). "Reasonable suspicion requires
less than probable cause but more than speculation or instinct on the part of the
officer." State v. Horton, 150 Idaho 300, 302, 246 P.3d 673, 675 (Ct. App. 2010)
(citation omitted).

Whether an officer possessed reasonable suspicion is

evaluated based on the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at or
before the time of the stop. Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811,203 P.3d at 1210; State v.
Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983, 88 P.3d 1220, 1223 (Ct. App. 2003).
Deputy Bates stopped Rainier after observing him make a left-hand turn
into the far right-hand lane. (Tr., p.18, Ls.18-20.) Idaho Code§ 49-644 governs
required position and method of turning on Idaho highways and provides, in
relevant part:
The driver of a vehicle intending to turn left shall approach the turn
in the extreme left-hand lane lawfully available to traffic moving in
the direction of travel of the vehicle. Whenever practicable the left
turn shall be made to the left of the center of the intersection and so
as to leave the intersection or other location in the extreme lefthand lane lawfully available to traffic moving in the same direction
on the highway being entered.
§ 49-644 (2). The district court found the plain language of this statute required a
left-hand turn be made into the left-hand lane of travel.

(Tr., p.54, Ls.1-3.)

Deputy Bates observed Rainier make a "very wide, unsafe left-hand turn" (Tr.,
p.19, L.25) into the far right-hand lane, where it was "encroaching on another
lane" (Tr., p.20, L.5).

Rainier argues that requiring a left-hand turn from an

intersection be made into the left-hand lane instead of crossing over adjoining
lanes does not promote safety and is therefore not what the statute clearly
provides. (Appellant's brief, p.16.)
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The objective of statutory interpretation is to give effect to legislative
intent. State v. Pina, 149 Idaho 140, 144, 233 P.3d 71, 75 (2010); Robison v.
Bateman-Hall, Inc., 139 Idaho 207, 210, 76 P.3d 951, 954 (2003). Because the
best guide to legislative intent is the wording of the statute itself, the
interpretation of a statute must begin with its literal words.

Verska v. Saint

Alphonsus Reg'I Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 893, 265 P.3d 502, 506 (2011); State
v. Doe, 147 Idaho 326, 328, 208 P.3d 730, 732 (2009). The words of a statute
'"must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and the statute must be
construed as a whole. If the statute is not ambiguous, this Court does not
construe it, but simply follows the law as written."' Verska, 151 Idaho at 893, 265
P.3d at 506 (quoting State v. Schwartz, 139 Idaho 360, 362, 79 P.3d 719, 721
(2003)).

"[W]here statutory language is unambiguous, legislative history and

other extrinsic evidence should not be consulted for the purpose of altering the
clearly expressed intent of the legislature." lQ.,. (quoting City of Sun Valley v. Sun
Valley Co., 123 Idaho 665,667,851 P.2d 961,963 (1993)).
The language of the statute in question is unambiguous. When making a
left-hand turn from the extreme left-hand turning lane, the turn should be made
"to the left of the center of the intersection" and into what constitutes the "extreme
left-hand lane" "[w]henever practicable." I.C. § 49-644 (2). The plain language of
the statute clearly directs a driver to turn from the extreme left-hand lane to the
extreme left-hand lane when practicable. Rainier did not do that.

Instead, he

made an unsafe and too-wide turn from the extreme left-hand lane to the righthand lane, "encroaching on" that lane and causing a dangerous situation where
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vehicles in the right-hand lane could have "collided with [Rainier's] vehicle." (Tr.,
p.20, Ls.1-6.)
Because it is undisputed that Rainier turned from the extreme left-hand
lane into the right-hand lane when he could have turned into the extreme lefthand lane, the district court correctly upheld the traffic stop as being justified by a
reasonable, articulable suspicion that Rainier violated I.C. § 49-644(2). Rainier
has failed to show error in the denial of his motion to suppress.

CONCLUSION

The state respectfully requests this to affirm Rainier's judgment of
conviction and sentence.

DATED this yth day of Apri
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this yth day of April, 2015, I caused two true
and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to be placed in the
United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:
JAY LOGSDON
Deputy Public Defender
P.O. Box 9000
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816

NLS/pm

12

